Supply chains have emerged as one of the most critical factors in determining a nation’s ability to sustain a conflict. The availability of equipment, spare parts and essential components plays a crucial role in how a country prepares for war and maintains its military capabilities once fighting begins.Recognising this vulnerability, the Defence Ministry is looking beyond the weapons and equipment it procures to examine what goes inside them, including those manufactured domestically. The government has moved beyond restricting direct imports to scrutinising the origins of electronics, software, sensors and critical subsystems fitted into Indian-built military platforms.The concern is security. Components sourced from potentially hostile countries could be exploited to compromise communications, expose sensitive information or disrupt military operations. This effort to secure defence supply chains has gathered momentum since 2020.The first major step came in July 2020, when the government amended the General Financial Rules to restrict public procurement from firms based in countries that share a land border with India. Bidders from these countries, including China, must register with a competent authority and obtain clearance before participating in government procurement. The rules cover purchases of goods, services and works by government entities, but do not impose a blanket ban on every Chinese-origin component used by private Indian manufacturers.The restrictions became more targeted in 2023, when, according to Reuters, India barred domestic military drone manufacturers from using Chinese-origin components, including cameras, radio transmission equipment, communication systems and software. In 2024, an order for 200 medium-altitude logistics drones was reportedly put on hold until the manufacturer could demonstrate that the systems contained no Chinese components. The episode highlighted the difficulty of tracing individual subsystems in military equipment assembled in India using parts sourced from across the world.
Testing what goes inside
In March 2026, the Army Design Bureau (ADB) released a draft framework for assessing security vulnerabilities in drones. It covers flight controllers, electronic speed controllers, communication and navigation equipment, sensors, firmware and ground-control software. The proposed framework includes hardware inspections, software validation, penetration testing and checks of hardware and software bills of materials. Vendors found to have provided incorrect information about the origins of critical components could face action. A business daily reported in August that the framework was still awaiting approval.The Army is also setting up AASHVAST laboratories, short for Assessment and Analysis of Electronic Systems Hardware for Vulnerabilities and Security Threats. Six such facilities are planned, with the first already operational in Delhi. The laboratories will examine drone hardware, embedded software and firmware for hidden commands, unauthorised access and foreign-origin components. CCTV cameras installed at military establishments could eventually come under similar scrutiny.
Building alternatives
The government is also trying to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers by developing domestic alternatives. The SRIJAN portal, launched in August 2020, allows defence public sector undertakings and the armed forces to list imported items that Indian companies can indigenise. A parliamentary committee report in March 2026 said more than 15,400 items listed on the portal had been indigenised.The Ministry of Defence’s Positive Indigenisation Lists identify thousands of components that must be sourced locally after specified deadlines. Meanwhile, the draft Defence Acquisition Procedure 2026 proposes raising the indigenous content requirement under the Buy (Indian-IDDM) category from 50% to 60%.Eliminating Chinese components entirely, however, remains difficult. India’s defence industry continues to depend on international supply chains for specialised electronics, sensors, processors and communication equipment. Assembling a military platform in India is not the same as manufacturing the critical technologies that go inside it.That is why the government’s strategy now combines procurement restrictions, technical inspections and efforts to strengthen domestic manufacturing. The question is no longer simply where a weapon is assembled, but where the critical components inside it come from, and whether any of them could be exploited when India needs its military equipment the most.